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‘Vox Populi?:’ Assessing NATO Popularity Relative to Political and Economic
Indicators in Selected Member Nations
Abstract
This paper seeks to identify the impact of political and economic conditions on a nation’s popularity/
favorability ratings towards North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the world’s most powerful military alliance.
It is found that in random-effect models there exists a significant positive relationship between a
country’s democratic strength and favorability, as well as a negative relationship regarding
unemployment. In fixed-effect models, however, there is slight evidence of a positive relationship with percapita GDP, as well as negative relationships with the unemployment rate and the trade index. Overall,
differences in member-nations largely account for whether democratic or macroeconomic conditions
influence support.
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Introduction
In December 2019, President Donald Trump chose not to mince words when
attending a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summit of numerous world
leaders in London. Speaking of Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau during a meeting
with German Chancellor Merkel, the then-president said to reporters:
I find him to be a very nice guy but you know the truth is that I called him
out [on] the fact that he’s not paying two percent [of gross domestic product]
… He’s not paying two percent and he should be paying two percent.
Canada – they have the money. (Wintour and Mason, 2019).
Even as a candidate three years prior, Mr. Trump had long been calling on other
NATO member-states to contribute more to the Alliance, or risk losing American
protections (Gould, 2020; Vinograd, 2016). Approximately seventy percent of
NATO funding comes from the United States, leading to potential criticism despite
bipartisan support (Fagan, 2020; Fagan and Poushter, 2020; Tirpak, 2020). Indeed,
for these reasons President Trump was driven to even entertain leaving the Alliance
altogether (Crowley, 2020).
According to the US State Department (2020), the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization was founded in 1949 to provide collective security against the Soviet
Union and greater Eastern Bloc. The original signatories were Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal,
the United Kingdom, and the United States. NATO has welcomed many new
members in the succeeding decades, including many former Soviet-influenced
nations.
In 2014, each nation made a commitment to spend at least two percent of
their gross domestic product (GDP) on NATO defense by the year 2024. However,
no incentivization or punishments exist to aid member-states in reaching this goal,
and less than a third are on track to do so (Chollet et al., 2020).
In terms of structure, under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, an act of
aggression against one member is considered an act of aggression against all NATO
members (NATO, 1949). This provides the benefits of collective defense to all
NATO members in the event of an attack. To date, the only instance in which
Article 5 was invoked was the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks, in
which members mobilized to help guard American airspace as well as assist in
antiterrorism operations in the eastern Mediterranean (Gordon, 2001; Pruitt, 2018).
Regarding conflict post-Cold War, every nation in NATO receives the same level
of mutual protection from the other twenty-nine member-states’ militiaries,
regardless of amounts contributed (Kottasová, 2017). This differs from, for
example, the financial operations of the International Monetary Fund, where
assistance levels are dependent on how much each country contributes into the
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system. Furthermore, in times of conflict, nations often voluntarily make additional
contributions of manpower or weapons (Daalder and Goldgeier, 2006).
Theory
Extensive past research has been conducted attempting to ascertain the
effectiveness of NATO, and its role in the future of global political and military
affairs. However, none have examined the aspect of domestic political and
economic indicators impactors on a nation’s internal public perception. It is the goal
of this paper to contribute to that standing gap in literature.
Simply put, across the NATO membership, what impact does the state of a
nation’s government have on domestic favorability? From a public economics
perspective, what of standard of living, international trade, or macroeconomic
performance? How do they impact civilian attitudes towards the Alliance? Do
NATO member-states’ people tend to have worsened positive perceptions over
time, or rather do they improve with tenure of membership?
The author hypothesizes that stronger domestic economic performance and
political stability will be associated with greater support for NATO. A nation
experiencing an economic downturn, it can be supposed, would typically have
residents less supportive of international alliances and initiatives. Citizens would
become more adverse to international cooperatives they believe counter to
economic interests (Gelpi and Grieco, 2008). Similarly, a country more integrated
into the global economic system via international trade may have greater
favorability towards NATO. Stronger democracies also can have citizens more
committed to an organization that protects fellow democratic institutions and
overall principles (Waterman et al., 2002).
The intent of this paper is to examine the effect of political and economic
factors on popularity regarding the Alliance. Its goal is to determine whether such
a relationship exists at a significant level. Analysis is conducted through an OLS
regression and panel data methodology.
Literature Review
There exist previous empirical studies on the economic and political theory
surrounding NATO. This paper’s research is unique however in that it utilizes
cross-national survey data relative to non-military indicators, and treats this survey
data as the dependent variable.
The research Kiratli (2020) aligns to an extent with this paper, utilizing PRC
data in an analysis of support for NATO and the United Nations (UN) and finding
that dissatisfaction with the economy is associated with less support towards both
groups.
Nations who are not members of NATO share some research with the
purview of this paper. White et al. (2006) examined survey data in Belarus, Russia,
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and Ukraine, analyzing support for and opposition to NATO membership relative
to participant indicators such as gender, education, income level, and age. Ydén et
al. (2019) worked to further understand the political environment regarding NATO
in Sweden (an officially neutral non-member-state), noting its continued
governmental closeness to the Alliance and its operations despite somewhat
ambiguous public opinion on it. Zilberman and Weber (2003) studied “aspirant
[member] countries.”
In addition, among member-states, the existence of a Cold War-era alliance
following the end of the Cold War gives ambiguity to the modern role and validity
of such a partnership (Yost, 1998; Daalder and Goldgeier, 2006; Tirpak, 2020); this
feeling may well be shared by policymakers and survey respondents alike.
Specific to public opinion, Baum and Potter (2008) note increased attention
to a number of policy issues (to include economics) in the short term following the
topic’s mentioning by Queen Elizabeth. Przeworski (1996) studied how economic
conditions impacted public support for economic reform in Poland. Milner and
Tingley (2013) posit a liberal-conservative ideological divide regarding public
opinion on the economics of foreign aid. While DeRouen and Peake (2002) suggest
that governments may initiate force to divert public attention from underperforming
national economies, they do not note public opinion nor alliances. Oneal and Tir
(2006) similarly note that very slow growth rates increase the likelihood of military
confrontation.
Reviewing past articles and research, it is evident that none have yet
accounted for the impact of changes within national politics or economics on
domestic favorability in the ways proposed here. This paper hopes to make such a
contribution to existing research by analyzing the influence of how domestic
favorability is potentially affected in such ways.
Data
This paper uses two separate datasets on perceptions of NATO, and then a
combined dataset of both. The varied sourcing of data as measures of the dependent
variable also thereby serves as a robustness check.
The first dataset from the Pew Research Center (PRC) (Fagan, 2020; Fagan
and Poushter, 2020) tracks favorability towards NATO among several European
nations, as well as the USA and Canada, between 2009 and 2019 (except for 2014).
PRC used a mix of face-to-face and phone interviews, with its 2019 survey totaling
21,029 respondents. The second dataset is from the Transatlantic Trends series of
the German Marshall Fund of the United States (2021). Respondents there,
numbering about a thousand per country per year, were asked if they believed
NATO was still essential to their respective country’s security. Partial response data
have been collected from 2002 to 2014, as well as 2020. The third dataset combines
the two survey datasets; while results hardly overlap, in the few instances of
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overlapping results (e.g., two popularity ratings for France in 2020), values are
averaged, giving each equal credence in analysis. Linear interpolation is also used
for missing data, accounting for 14.86% of datapoints.
All member nations for which there were survey data are being examined.
These include member states Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech Republic.
Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands,
Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United
States. In addition, Russia, Sweden, and Ukraine, non-members, have reported data
in the PRC dataset only, and are included in the PRC and combined datasets at
certain points.
Economically, GDP per capita is included as a proxy for nation-wide
standard of living, with data from the World Bank (2021). Unemployment rates are
used as an indicator of national macroeconomic performance with data from the
International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2021). Politically, an index of the strength of
liberal-democratic institutions, as reported by the University of Gothenburg’s VDem Institute (2021), accounts for quality of governance. Values in the index range
from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating more democratic institutions. This
descriptive index is used rather than other measures such as Polity5, which only
takes on an absolute value ranging from -10 to 10; the democracy dataset used here
is more nuanced.
Trade indices (OECD, 2021) measure the level of national integration into
the global economy. The tenure variable, the difference between the year of each
survey and the year in which that country joined NATO, most accurately measures
the length of time during which that nation has been a member.
For controls, I include data on population (UN, 2021) to account for country
size, and military expenditure as a share of GDP (SIPRI, 2020) to account for the
relative militarization of, and risk in, each country. The former controls for potential
‘free-rider’ status among sparsely-populated members states (Zannella, 2020),
while the later aims to control for contemporary international phenomena
(Kostadinova, 2000).
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Table 1. Data and Sources
Variable
GDP per capita
(2015 US
dollars)
Unemployment
rate
Liberal
democracy
index
Trade index
(proportion of
GDP)

N
276

Mean
St. Dev.
26,064.6 195,994.5
2

Min
644.39

266

9.072

5.11

1.33

27.467

275

0.74

0.172

0.11

0.882

276

0.888

0.428

0.234

1.907

Population
(millions)

277

53.153

68.527

2.794

329.484

Military
expenditure
(percent of
GDP)

277

1.772

0.819

0.763

4.923

Tenure of
membership

269

48.617

22.395

3

72

Support for
NATO

115

56.139

14.143

12

82

Consider
NATO
essential

140

60.897

10.178

30.309

91.8
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Max
60,386.7
7

Source
World Bank
(2021)
V-Dem
Institute
(2021)
Organization
for Economic
Co-operation
and
Development
(2021)
United
Nations
(2021)
Stockholm
International
Peace
Research
Institute
(2020)
North Atlantic
Treaty
Organization
(2021)
Pew Research
Center (Fagan,
2020; Fagan
and Poushter,
2020)

German
Marshall
Fund of the
United States
(2021)
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Methods
The objective of these models is to account for relative domestic economic and
political factors that affect the degree to which a member-nation’s population
supports NATO. Therefore, the following regression model is proposed:
(1)
ΔFAV = β + β ΔGDP + β ΔUN + β ΔDEM + β ΔTRADE +
β ΔPOP + β ΔEXP + β TENURE +∈
i = 1, 2, 3, … 23
t = 1, 2, 3, … 19
Where, for a given nation i in year t, ΔGDP is the change in GDP per capita; ΔUN
is the change in the unemployment rate; ΔDEM is the change in index of liberal
democracy; ΔTRADE is the change in the index of trade; ΔPOP is the change in
population; ΔEXP is the change in national military expenditure; TENURE is the
aforementioned tenure variable; and ΔFAV, the dependent variable, is the change
in the proportion of citizens reporting favorable views towards NATO.
When incorporating data which include nations not members of NATO
(Russia, Ukraine, and Sweden), I substitute the TENURE variable for a standard
trend variable TREND, which accounts for longitudinal changes in non-member
states:
(2)
ΔFAV = β + β ΔGDP + β ΔUN + β ΔDEM + β ΔTRADE +
β ΔPOP + β ΔEXP + β TREND +∈
Finally, my third specification uses a dummy variable equal to 1 when a nation is a
NATO member and 0 otherwise, to more thoroughly juxtapose member and nonmember nations:
(3)
ΔFAV = β + β ΔGDP + β ΔUN + β ΔDEM + β ΔTRADE +
β ΔPOP + β ΔEXP + β TREND + β MEMBER ∈
The use of fixed-effect or random-effect methods is somewhat ambiguous. A series
of Hausman (1972) tests (results in Table 2) indicates that random-effect methods
are best for the individual PRC dataset, while either random- or fixed-effects are
best for the GMFUS dataset and the combined dataset. Therefore, random-effect
methods are utilized for all models, while the PRC dataset is omitted from the fixedeffects table. (The membership dummy must also be precluded from the fixedeffect results, as they are already captured in the cross-sectional intercept
differences inherent to the method.)
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Table 2. Hausman Test Results
H0: Both fixed- and random-effect methods give consistent estimators.
Ha: Fixed-effect methods give consistent estimators.
Dataset
P-value
Chi2 statistic
Appropriate
method

PRC
0.282
8.61
Random

GMFUS
0.0000
62.90
Fixed

Combined
0.0002
28.45
Fixed

All changes are in logarithmic form. Regressions were calculated using the
software Stata, version 16.1.
Results and Discussion
The models yield several results at statistically significant levels. Results are
depicted in Tables 3 and 4.
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Table 3. Random-Effect Regression Results
Pew Research Center Data

GDP per capita
Unemployment
rate
Liberal
democracy
index
Trade
openness
Population
Total military
expenditure
Tenure

(1)
0.3051*
(0.052)
-0.0846*
(0.060)
0.1611
(0.259)

(2)
0.1150
(0.140)
-0.1576***
(0.003)
0.3545***
(0.002)

(3)
0.0984
(0.140)
-0.1628***
(0.003)
0.3006**
(0.019)

0.0185
(0.865)
-0.0186
(0.764)
0.0568
(0.383)
-0.0071**
(0.014)

0.2072
(0.143)
-0.0013
(0.982)
0.0736
(0.366)

0.1831
(0.204)
-0.0058
(0.922)
0.0691
(0.398)

-0.0096**
(0.047)

-0.0100**
(0.040)
0.1567
(0.338)
0.5524
139

Trend
Member
R2
N

0.2829
123

0.5437
139

Favorability
German
Marshall Fund
Data
(4)
(5)
-0.0245
0.0192
(0.222)
(0.247)
-0.0156
-0.0578**
(0.698)
(0.035)
0.2972***
0.0222
(0.009)
(0.822)

-0.1557
(0.137)
-0.0620
(0.190)
-0.0912
(0.299)
0.0016
(0.301)

0.2363
128

0.0765
(0.390)
0.0020
(0.862)
0.0112
(0.862)
-0.0007
(0.565)

0.2143
216

Combined Dataset
(6)
0.0249
(0.208)
-0.0863***
(0.006)
0.3058***
(0.000)

(7)
0.0257
(0.190)
-0.0925***
(0.003)
0.2770***
(0.006)

0.1043
(0.318)
-0.0121
(0.783)
-0.0110
(0.874)

0.0961
(0.347)
-0.0098
(0.817)
-0.0205
(0.764)

-0.0005
(0.872)

-0.0008
(0.765)
0.2430**
(0.033)
0.4957
232

0.4714
232

p-values in parentheses. * p < 0.100 ** p < 0.050 ** p < 0.001
(1) PRC dataset of member states, 2009 – 2019
(2) PRC dataset of member and non-member states, 2009 – 2019
(3) PRC dataset of member and non-member states, with membership dummy (4) GMFUS dataset of member states, 2009 – 2019
(5) Combined dataset of member states, 2002 – 2019
(6) Combined dataset of member and non-member states, 2002 – 2019
(7) Combined dataset of member and non-member states, 2002 – 2019, with membership dummy
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Table 4. Fixed-Effect Regression Results

GDP per capita
Unemployment rate
Liberal democracy
index
Trade openness
Population
Total military
expenditure
Tenure
Trend
R2
N

(1)
0.7168***
(0.002)
0.1350**
(0.011)
0.2001
(0.323)
-0.6309***
(0.000)
-1.2167
(0.150)
-0.1173
(0.326)
0.0067
(0.221)
0.0065
128

Favorability
GMFUS Data
(2)
0.0143
(0.398)
-0.0030
(0.921)
-0.1479
(0.209)
0.0322
(0.774)
-1.1328**
(0.011)
0.0073
(0.919)
0.0011
(0.584)
0.0019
216

Combined Dataset
(3)
0.0081
(0.691)
0.0096
(0.790)
-0.0754
(0.553)
-0.0148
(0.918)
-1.6891***
(0.005)
0.0017
(0.984)
0.0053
0.0298
232

p-values in parentheses. * p < 0.100 ** p < 0.050 ** p < 0.001
(1) GMFUS dataset of member states, 2002 – 2014
(2) Combined dataset of member states, 2002 – 2019
(3) Combined dataset of member and non-member states, 2002 – 2019
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Random-effect results tend to suggest a positive relationship between the
democracy index and favorability, as well as a negative relationship between the
unemployment rate and favorability. The only column in Table 3 without a
significantly negative relationship regarding unemployment is (4), the GMFUS
partial dataset of member states. As the models progressively differentiate based on
membership status, first through the incorporation of non-member data and then
the addition of a dummy variable, the impact of unemployment on favorability
grows in magnitude. E.g., the changes made to PRC data from columns (2) to (3),
or the changes to the combined dataset columns between (5), (6), and (7).
Respective to dataset, each unemployment-related coefficient lessens in value (i.e.,
the negative relationship becomes more pronounced). Regarding democracy, the
opposite appears true. Better differentiation and juxtaposition based on membership
status lessens the impact of democratic institutions’ strength on favorability.
In fixed-effect models which by definition hold constant cross-sectional
country differences, results are parsimonious. The GMFUS dataset (the PRC
dataset was omitted due to the Hausman test’s results, as mentioned) reports
significant relationships regarding GDP per capita (positive), unemployment
(negative), and trade openness (negative). The unemployment coefficient is
significant at the 95% confidence level, while GDP per capita and trade are
significant at the 99% confidence level. A negative coefficient with respect to trade
may be indicative of distorted political preconceptions given changing trade
environments, as discussed by Rankin (2001).
These economic results dissipate when combining the PRC and GMFUS
datasets, with only national population being a significant negative impactor (i.e.,
more populated nations favor NATO less). The combined-dataset impact of
population grows stronger when including non-member states in data, and its
confidence level rises. Again, all changes are logarithmic.
Conclusion
This research was conceived and conducted with the goal of identifying political
and economic impactors on a the perceptions of NATO by a nation’s people. It has
been demonstrated here that democratic institutions and the unemployment rate
both emerge as factors influencing national support for NATO, though these are
almost certainly due to cross-country differences; only when accounting for these
differences does slight evidence of a positive relationship with macroeconomic
performance (GDP per capita and the unemployment rate) and a negative
relationship with global economic (trade) integration. This affirms the stipulations
of Milner and Tingley (2013), who note relative stability on public support for
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foreign aid (irrespective to NATO) between countries. Heinrich et al. (2016) build
on this, attributing lack of public support for foreign aid during economic
downturns as an instigator of cuts.
In terms of policy implications, the aspect of domestic support for defense
alliances as a consequence of non-defense policy developments in such a context
may provide future insight for policymakers and military leadership alike
concerning government accountability, as well as the world’s largest military
alliance in particular. An informed and engaged public across the former ‘First
World’ increasingly appears to associate lower-performance and weaker national
democracies with dissatisfaction towards the Alliance, in an apparent clash between
foreign and domestic objectives.
In relatively democratic nations and global leaders such as those countries
that constitute NATO, it is the hope of the author that this paper may serve to some
degree to inform the policy debate in the western world concerning contributions
to, and expenditures by, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
Regarding limitations, this author regrets that this research was unable to
assess policy developments, such as the 2014 Ukraine crisis, in its analyses. It is
hoped that future research expands on these models and concepts within such a
context (for instance, two-way fixed-effect analysis) so as to better inform the
scholarly community and world about an organization that may well ensure peace
and prosperity in the modern era.
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